NVIDIA CORP (NVDA)

Other than the risk factors listed below, there have been no material changes from the risk factors previously described under Item 1A of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 26, 2025 and Item 1A of our Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarters ended April 27, 2025 and July 27, 2025. 25, 2026.

Purchasing or owning NVIDIA common stock involves investment risks including, but not limited to, the risks described in Item 1A of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 26, 2025, 25, 2026, and Item 1A below. Any one of those risks could harm our Quarterly business, financial condition and results of operations or reputation, which could cause our stock price to decline. Additional risks, trends and uncertainties not presently known to us or that we currently believe are immaterial may also harm our business, financial condition, results of operations or reputation.

Reports on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarters ended April 27, 2025 Competition could adversely impact our market share and July 27, 2025, and below. Any one of those risks could harm our business, financial condition and results of operations or reputation, which could cause our stock price to decline. Additional risks, trends and uncertainties not presently known to us or that we currently believe are immaterial may also harm our business, financial condition, results of operations or reputation. results.

Long manufacturing lead times Our target markets remain competitive, and uncertain supply competition may intensify with expanding and capacity availability, combined with a failure to estimate changing product and service offerings, industry standards, customer demand accurately, has led and could lead to mismatches between supply market needs, new entrants and demand. consolidations. Other companies compete

with us on a wide range of parameters including price, total cost of ownership, and performance, which has resulted and may in the future result in lower-than-expected selling prices or demand for our products. Some of our competitors operate their own fabrication facilities, and have longer operating histories, larger customer bases, more comprehensive IP portfolios and patent protections, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing and distribution resources than we do. These competitors may be able to acquire market share and/or prevent us from doing so, more effectively identify and capitalize upon opportunities in new markets and end-user trends, more quickly transition their products, and impinge on our ability to procure sufficient foundry capacity and scarce input materials during a supply-constrained environment, which could harm our business. Some of our customers are developing their own ASICs and other products, including designs optimized for certain workloads that may not require all of the features and functionality our data center systems provide. Others may offer cloud-based services that compete with our AI cloud service offerings, and we may not be able to establish market share sufficient to achieve the scale necessary to meet our business objectives. If we are unable to successfully compete in this environment, demand for our products, services, and technologies could decrease, which may negatively impact our business.

Long manufacturing lead times and uncertain supply and capacity availability, combined with a failure to estimate customer demand accurately, has led and could in the future lead to mismatches between supply and demand.

We have long manufacturing lead times and build finished products and maintain inventory in advance of anticipated demand. In periods of shortages impacting the semiconductor industry and/or limited supply or capacity in our supply chain, the lead times for certain supply may be extended. We have previously experienced and may continue to experience extended lead times of more than 12 months. To secure future supply and capacity, we have paid premiums, provided deposits, and entered into long-term supply agreements and capacity commitments, which have increased our product costs and this may continue. We may still be unable to secure sufficient commitments for capacity to address our business needs.

If we inaccurately estimate demand, or our customers change orders, as we have experienced in the past, we may not be able to reduce our supply commitments in time, at the same rate, or at all. Significant mismatches between supply and demand have varied across our market platforms, resulted in both product shortages and excess inventory, significantly harmed our financial results and could reoccur. If we underestimate demand, and our foundry partners and contract manufacturers are unable to increase production or provide sufficient supply, we may not be able to meet increased customer demand in a timely manner, or at all. Our reputation and customer relationships could be damaged and we could lose revenue and market share. Additionally, since some of our products are part of a complex data center buildout, supply constraints or availability issues with respect to any one component have had and may have a broader revenue impact. For example, our ability to sell certain products has been and could be impeded if components necessary for the finished products are not available from third parties.

If we overestimate demand, or if customers cancel or defer orders or choose to purchase from our competitors, we may not be able to utilize on-hand inventory or reduce purchase commitments accordingly. We have had to reduce average selling prices, including due to our channel pricing programs, increase prices for certain of our products as a result of our suppliers’ increase in prices, write down our inventory, incur cancellation penalties, and record impairments, and may have to do so in the future. These impacts The impact of these risks would be amplified by our non-cancellable and non-returnable purchase orders placed in advance of our historical lead times and could be exacerbated if we need to make changes to the design of future products. The risk of these impacts has These risks have increased and may continue to increase as our purchase obligations and prepaids have grown and are expected to continue to grow and become a greater portion of our total supply. All of these factors may negatively impact our gross margins and financial results.

Factors that have caused and/or could in the future cause us to underestimate or overestimate demand, and impact the timing and volume of our revenue, include:

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changes in product development cycles and time to market;

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competing technologies and competitor product releases, announcements or other actions;

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changes in business and economic conditions;

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sudden or sustained government lockdowns or public health issues;

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rapidly changing technology or customer requirements;

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the availability of sufficient data center capacity or energy for customers to procure;

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new product introductions and transitions resulting in less demand for existing products;

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new or unexpected end-use cases;

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increase in demand for competitive products;

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changes in end-user demand;

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purchasing decisions made, and inventory levels held by, distributors, ODMs, OEMs, system integrators, other channel partners and other third parties;

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the ability of developers, end customers and other third parties to build, enhance, and maintain accelerated computing applications that leverage our platforms;

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the demand for accelerated computing, AI-related cloud services, or large language models;

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changes that impact the ecosystem for the architectures underlying our products and technologies;

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government actions or changes in governmental policies, such as export controls, increased restrictions on gaming usage, or tariffs tariffs;

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our customers’ and partners’ ability to secure capital and energy and to build complex datacenter data center infrastructure timely; and

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the availability of third-party content on our platforms, such as GeForce NOW.

The availability of data centers, energy, and capital to support the buildout of NVIDIA AI infrastructure by our customers and partners is crucial, and any shortage of these and other necessary resources could impact our future revenue and financial performance. Expanding energy capacity to meet demand is a complex, multi-year process involving significant regulatory, technical, and construction challenges. In addition, access to capital can be particularly constrained for less-capitalized companies, which may face difficulties securing financing for large-scale infrastructure projects. These limitations could delay customer and partner deployments or reduce the scale of accelerated computing and AI adoption.

Challenges in estimating demand could become more pronounced or volatile in the future on both a global and regional basis. Extended lead times may occur if we experience other supply constraints caused by natural disasters, pandemics or other events. Geopolitical tensions in regions where we rely on suppliers, contract manufacturers, and assembly partners that are critical to our supply continuity, could have a material adverse impact on us. Supply availability affecting memory, and other components, as well as rising prices, may drive the prices for data center buildouts higher. Publicly announced intentions by governments or other companies to purchase our products can further complicate our demand estimates, as such announcements are often non-binding and may not result in committed volumes.

We continue to increase our supply and capacity purchases with existing and new suppliers to support our demand projections and increasing complexity of our data center products. With these additions, we We have also entered and may continue to enter into prepaid manufacturing and capacity agreements to supply both current and future products. The increased purchase volumes and integration of new suppliers and contract manufacturers into our supply chain creates more complexity in managing multiple suppliers with variations in production planning, execution and logistics. Our expanding product portfolio and varying component compatibility and quality may lead to increased inventory levels. We have incurred and may in the future incur inventory provisions or impairments if our inventory or supply or capacity commitments exceed demand for our products or demand declines. We are increasing our U.S.-based manufacturing and investing in specialized equipment and processes to support domestic production. We may experience delays or difficulties in scaling production as planned. Our ability to increase manufacturing capabilities will depend on the domestic manufacturing ecosystem's capacity to ramp production supply to the required volume timely. Delays or shortfalls could impact our ability to meet demand.

Introducing or offering multiple architectures concurrently is complex and we often ship multiple architecture products simultaneously as our channel partners prepare to ship and support new products. We are increasing generally in various stages of introducing and/or offering the architectures of our U.S.-based manufacturing Data Center and investing in specialized equipment Edge Computing products. The computing industry is experiencing a broader and processes to support domestic production. We may experience delays or difficulties in scaling production as planned. Our ability to increase manufacturing capabilities will depend on the domestic manufacturing ecosystem's capacity to ramp production supply to the required volume timely. Delays or shortfalls could impact our ability faster launch cadence of accelerated computing platforms to meet demand. a growing and diverse set of AI opportunities. We have introduced a new product and architecture cadence of our Data Center solutions where we seek to complete new computing solutions each year and provide a greater variety of Data Center offerings, including our Rubin platform which is expected to start shipping in the second half of fiscal year 2027. The increased frequency of these architecture introductions and the larger number of products and product configurations may magnify the challenges associated with managing our supply and demand which may further create volatility in our revenue. Qualification time for new products, customers anticipating new architecture introductions, and channel partners reducing channel inventory of prior architectures ahead of new product introductions can reduce, or create volatility in, our revenue. Customers may delay adopting new architectures if their data center infrastructure is not ready, which could affect the timing of our revenue. We have experienced and may in the future experience reduced demand for current generation architectures when customers anticipate new architectures, and we may be unable to sell multiple product architectures at the same time. Our financial results have been and may in the future be negatively impacted if we are unable to execute our architectural introductions as planned for any reason. The increased frequency and complexity of newly introduced products could result in unanticipated quality or production issues that could increase the magnitude of inventory provisions, warranty, or other costs or result in product delays. For example, our gross margins in the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 were negatively impacted by inventory provisions for low-yielding Blackwell material.

Product transitions are complex and we often ship both new and prior architecture products simultaneously as our channel partners prepare to ship and support new products. We are generally in various stages of transitioning the architectures of our Data Center, Gaming, Professional Visualization, and Automotive products. The computing industry is experiencing a broader and faster launch cadence of accelerated computing platforms to meet a growing and diverse set of AI opportunities. We have introduced a new product and architecture cadence of our Data Center solutions where we seek to complete new computing solutions each year and provide a greater variety of Data Center offerings. The increased frequency of these transitions and the larger number of products and product configurations may magnify the challenges associated with managing our supply and demand which may further create volatility in our revenue. Qualification time incur significant engineering development resources for new products, customers anticipating and changes to our product transitions, and channel partners reducing channel inventory of prior architectures ahead of new product introductions can reduce, roadmap may impact our ability to develop other products or create volatility in, adequately manage our revenue. supply chain cost. Customers may delay adopting purchasing existing products as we increase the frequency of new architectures if their data center infrastructure is products or may not ready, which could affect be able to adopt our new products as fast as forecasted, both impacting the timing of our revenue. We revenue and supply chain cost. While we have experienced managed concurrent architecture introductions and/or offerings and may in the future experience reduced demand for current generation architectures when customers anticipate transitions, and we may be unable to sell have sold multiple product architectures at the same time for current time, these efforts are difficult, may impair our ability to predict demand and future architecture transitions. Our financial results have been impact our supply mix, and may in the future be negatively impacted if we are unable cause us to execute our architectural transitions as planned for any reason. The increased frequency and complexity of newly introduced products could result in unanticipated quality or production issues that could increase the magnitude of inventory provisions, warranty, or other costs or result in product delays. For example, our gross margins in the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 were negatively impacted by inventory provisions for low-yielding Blackwell material. incur additional costs.

We incur significant engineering development resources for new products, and changes to our product roadmap may impact our ability to develop other products or adequately manage our supply chain cost. Customers may delay purchasing existing products as we increase the frequency of new products or may not be able to adopt our new products as fast as forecasted, both impacting the timing of our revenue and supply chain cost. While we have managed prior product transitions and have sold multiple product architectures at the same time, these transitions are difficult, may impair our ability to predict demand and impact our supply mix, and may cause us to incur additional costs.

Demand estimates for our products, applications, and services can be incorrect, which may create volatility in our revenue or supply levels. We may not be able to generate significant revenue from them. Because our products may be used in multiple use cases and applications, it is difficult to estimate with any reasonable degree of precision the impact of accelerated computing and AI models on our reported revenue or forecasted demand.

The use of our GPUs for new, mercurial, or trendy applications, has impacted impacted, and can impact in the future, demand for our products, including by leading to inconsistent spikes and drops in demand. For example, several years ago, our Gaming gaming GPUs began to be used for mining digital currencies, such as Ethereum. It is difficult for us to estimate with any reasonable degree of precision the past or current impact of cryptocurrency mining, or forecast the future impact of cryptocurrency mining, on demand for our products. Volatility in the cryptocurrency market, including new compute technologies, price changes in cryptocurrencies, government cryptocurrency policies and regulations, new cryptocurrency standards and changes in the method of verifying blockchain transactions, has impacted and can in the future impact cryptocurrency mining and demand for our products and can further impact our ability to estimate demand for our products. Changes to cryptocurrency standards and processes including, but not limited to, the Ethereum 2.0 merge in 2022, have reduced and may in the future decrease the usage of GPUs for Ethereum mining. This has created and may in the future create increased aftermarket sales of our GPUs, which could negatively impact retail prices for our GPUs and reduce demand for our new GPUs. In general, our new products or previously sold products may be resold online or on the unauthorized “gray market,” which also makes demand forecasting difficult. Gray market products and reseller marketplaces compete with our new products and distribution channels. Our inability to accurately predict our demand that arises from new use cases may create volatility in our revenue.

We may not be able to realize the potential benefits of business investments or acquisitions, and we may not be able to successfully integrate acquired companies, which could hurt our ability to grow our business, develop new products or sell our products.

We acquire and invest in businesses that offer products, services and technologies that we believe will help expand or enhance our strategic objectives. Acquisitions or investments involve significant challenges and risks and could impair our ability to grow our business, develop new products or sell our products and ultimately could have a negative impact on our financial results. If we pursue a particular transaction, we may limit our ability to enter into other transactions that could help us achieve our other strategic objectives. If we are unable to timely complete acquisitions or investments, including due to delays and challenges in obtaining regulatory approvals, we may be unable to pursue other transactions, we may not be able to retain critical talent from the target company, technology may evolve and make the acquisition less attractive, and other changes can take place, which could reduce the anticipated benefits of the transaction and negatively impact our business. Regulators could also impose conditions that reduce the ultimate value of our acquisitions. In addition, to the extent that our perceived ability to consummate acquisitions is harmed, future acquisitions may be more difficult, complex or expensive.

Our investments in publicly traded and private companies could create volatility and fluctuations in our results. These investments may generate realized and unrealized gains or losses and we could realize losses up to the value of the investments. In addition, we have invested and may continue to invest in private companies to further our strategic objectives and to support certain key business initiatives. These companies can include early-stage companies still defining their strategic direction. Many of the securities in which we invest are non-marketable and illiquid at the time of our initial investment, and we may not be able to achieve a return. To the extent any of the companies in which we invest are not successful, we could recognize an impairment and/or lose all or part of our investment.

We expect to continue investing in strategic partnerships. In the third quarter of fiscal year 2026, we entered into a letter of intent with an opportunity to invest in OpenAI. In November 2025, we entered into an agreement, subject to certain closing conditions, to invest up to $10 billion in Anthropic. There is no assurance that we will enter into definitive agreements with respect to the OpenAI opportunity or other potential investments, or that any investment will be completed on expected terms, if at all. The timing and magnitude of these and other investments we may make will depend on various factors, including the ability of our partners to successfully develop and deploy AI infrastructure. There can be no certainty as to the timing or amount of capital we may ultimately invest in these or other strategic partnerships, and we may be limited by our available liquidity and capital resources.

We have committed to make an equity investment in Intel Corporation, subject to regulatory approval. This investment involves execution, financing, and operational risks, including dependence on the partner’s ability to scale production and deliver competitive technology on schedule. We may not realize the anticipated strategic benefits.

Our investment portfolio contains industry sector concentration risks, and a decline in any one or multiple industry sectors could increase our impairment losses.

We face additional risks related to acquisitions and strategic investments, including the diversion of capital and other resources, including management’s attention; difficulty in realizing a satisfactory return and uncertainties to realize the benefits of an acquisition or strategic investment, if at all; difficulty or inability in obtaining governmental, regulatory approval or restrictions or other consents and approvals or financing; legal proceedings initiated as a result of an

acquisition or investment; and potential failure of our due diligence processes to identify significant issues with the assets or company in which we are investing or are acquiring.

Additional risks related to acquisitions include, but are not limited to:

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difficulty in integrating the technology, systems, products, policies, processes, or operations and integrating and retaining the employees, including key personnel, of the acquired business;

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assumption of liabilities and incurring amortization expenses, impairment charges to goodwill or write-downs of acquired assets;

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integrating accounting, forecasting and controls, procedures and reporting cycles;

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coordinating and integrating operations, particularly in countries in which we do not currently operate;

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stock price impact, fines, fees or reputation harm if we are unable to obtain regulatory approval for an acquisition or are otherwise unable to close an acquisition;

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potential issuances of debt to finance our acquisitions, resulting in increased debt, increased interest expense, and compliance with debt covenants or other restrictions;

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the potential for our acquisitions to result in dilutive issuances of our equity securities;

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the potential variability of the amount and form of any performance-based consideration;

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negative changes in general economic conditions in the regions or the industries in which we or our target operate;

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exposure to additional cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities; and

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impairment of relationships with, or loss of our or our target’s employees, vendors and customers.

For example, when integrating acquisition target systems into our own, we have experienced and may continue to experience challenges including lengthy and costly systems integration, delays in purchasing and shipping products, difficulties with system integration via electronic data interchange and other processes with our key suppliers and customers, and training and change management needs of integration personnel. These challenges have impacted our results of operations and may continue to do so in the future.

We may be required to satisfy financial obligations under guarantees and other commercial commitments.

We have entered into, and may in the future enter into, commercial arrangements, including long-term capacity purchase obligations and financial guarantees supporting our customers’ and partners’ buildout of datacenter infrastructure. These arrangements expose us to counterparty risk, including customers' or partners' inability to secure necessary financing or infrastructure, significant project delays, or financial distress or insolvency. Despite our efforts to mitigate these exposures, if triggered, these obligations could require payments that may negatively impact our business, financial condition, or results of operations.

We are subject to complex laws, rules, regulations, and political and other actions, including restrictions on the export of our products, which may adversely impact our business.

We are subject to laws and regulations domestically and worldwide, affecting our operations in areas including, but not limited to, IP ownership and infringement; taxes; import and export requirements and tariffs; anti-corruption, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; business acquisitions; foreign exchange controls and cash repatriation restrictions; foreign ownership and investment; data privacy requirements; competition and antitrust; investing; advertising; employment; product regulations; cybersecurity; environmental, health, and safety requirements; the responsible use of AI; sustainability; cryptocurrency; and consumer laws. Compliance with such requirements can be onerous and expensive, could impact our competitive position, and may negatively impact our business operations and ability to manufacture and ship our products. There can be no assurance that our employees, contractors, suppliers, customers or agents will not violate applicable laws or the policies, controls, and procedures that we have designed to help ensure compliance with such laws, and violations could result in fines, criminal sanctions against us, our officers, or our employees, prohibitions on the conduct of our business, and damage to our reputation. Changes to the laws, rules and regulations to which we are subject, or changes to their interpretation and enforcement, could lead to materially greater compliance and other costs, and/or further restrictions on our ability to manufacture and supply our products and operate our business. For example, we may face increased compliance costs as a result of changes or increases in antitrust legislation, regulation, administrative rule making, increased focus from regulators on cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks. Our position in markets relating to AI has led to increased interest in our business from regulators worldwide, including the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, and China. For example, the French Competition Authority collected information from us regarding our business and competition in the graphics card and CSP market as part of an ongoing inquiry into competition in those markets. We have also received, and continue to receive, broad requests for information from competition regulators in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and South Korea regarding our sales of GPUs and other NVIDIA products, our efforts to allocate supply, foundation models and our investments, partnerships and other agreements with companies developing foundation models, the markets in which we compete and our competition, our strategies, roadmaps, and efforts to develop, market, and sell hardware, software, and system solutions, and our agreements with customers, suppliers, and partners. We expect to receive additional requests for information in the future. Such requests have been and are likely to be expensive and burdensome and could negatively impact our business and our relationships with customers, suppliers, and partners.

part of an ongoing inquiry into competition Governments and regulators are also considering, and in those markets. We certain cases, have also received, imposed restrictions on the hardware, software, and continue systems used to receive, broad requests for information from competition regulators in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and South Korea regarding our sales of GPUs and other NVIDIA products, our efforts to allocate supply, develop frontier foundation models and generative AI. For example, the EU AI Act became effective on August 1, 2024 and will be fully applicable after a two-year transitional period. The EU AI Act may impact our investments, partnerships ability to train, deploy, or release AI models in the EU. Several states are considering enacting or have already enacted regulations concerning AI technologies, with new state laws that took effect on January 1, 2026, which may impact our ability to train, deploy, or release AI models, and increase our compliance costs. Restrictions under these and any other agreements with companies developing foundation models, regulations, if implemented, could increase the markets in which we compete costs and burdens to us and our competition, our strategies, roadmaps, and efforts to develop, market, and sell hardware, software, and system solutions, and our agreements with customers, suppliers, and partners. We expect to receive additional requests for information in the future. Such requests have been and are likely to be expensive and burdensome and could negatively impact our business and our relationships with customers, suppliers, and partners. delay or halt deployment of

Governments and regulators are also considering, and in certain cases, have imposed restrictions on the hardware, software, and systems used to develop frontier foundation models and generative AI. For example, the EU AI Act became effective on August 1, 2024 and will be fully applicable after a two-year transitional period. The EU AI Act may impact our ability to train, deploy, or release AI models in the EU. Several states are considering enacting or have already enacted regulations concerning AI technologies, with new state laws scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2026, which may impact our ability to train, deploy, or release AI models, and increase our compliance costs. Restrictions under these and any other regulations, if implemented, could increase the costs and burdens to us and our customers, delay or halt deployment of new systems using our products, and reduce the number of new entrants and customers, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Revisions to laws or regulations or their interpretation and enforcement could also result in increased taxation, trade sanctions, the imposition of or increase to import duties or tariffs, restrictions and controls on imports or exports, or other retaliatory actions, which could have an adverse effect on our business plans or impact the timing of our shipments. Additionally, changes in the public perception of governments in the regions where we operate or plan to operate could negatively impact our business and results of operations.

Government actions, including trade protection and national and economic security policies of U.S. and foreign government bodies, such as tariffs, import or export regulations, including deemed export restrictions and restrictions on the activities of U.S. persons, trade and economic sanctions, decrees, quotas or other trade barriers and restrictions could affect our ability to ship products, provide services to our customers and employees, do business without an export license with entities on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s U.S. Entity List or other USG restricted parties lists (which is expected to change from time to time), and generally fulfill our contractual obligations and have a material adverse effect on our business. If we were ever found to have violated export control laws or sanctions of the U.S. or similar applicable non-U.S. laws, even if the violation occurred without our knowledge, we may be subject to various penalties available under the laws, any of which could have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition.

For example, in response to the war in Ukraine, the United States and other jurisdictions imposed economic sanctions and export control measures which blocked the passage of our products, services and support into Russia, Belarus, and certain regions of Ukraine. In fiscal year 2023, we stopped direct sales to Russia and closed business operations in Russia. Concurrently, the war in Ukraine has impacted sales in EMEA and may continue to do so in the future.

The increasing focus on the risks and strategic importance of AI technologies has resulted in regulatory restrictions that target products and services capable of enabling or facilitating AI and may in the future result in additional restrictions impacting some or all of our product and service offerings.

Concerns regarding third-party use of AI for purposes contrary to local governmental interests, including concerns relating to the misuse of AI applications, models, and solutions, has resulted in and could in the future result in unilateral or multilateral restrictions on products that can be used for training, modifying, tuning, and deploying LLMs and other AI applications. Such restrictions have limited and could in the future limit the ability of downstream customers and users worldwide to acquire, deploy and use systems that include our products, software, and services, and negatively impact our business and financial results.

Such restrictions could include additional unilateral or multilateral export controls on certain products or technology, including but not limited to AI technologies. As geopolitical tensions have increased, semiconductors associated with AI, including GPUs and related products, are increasingly the focus of export control restrictions proposed by stakeholders in the U.S. and its allies. The United States has imposed unilateral worldwide controls restricting GPUs and associated products, and it is likely that additional unilateral or multilateral controls will be adopted. Such controls have been and may again be very broad in scope and application, prohibit us from exporting our products to any or all customers in one or more markets, and could negatively impact our manufacturing, testing and warehousing locations and options, or could impose other conditions that limit our ability to serve demand abroad and could negatively and materially impact our business, revenue and financial results. Export controls and other restrictions targeting GPUs and semiconductors associated with AI, which have been imposed and are likely to be more restrictive, would further limit our ability to export our technology, products, or services, creating a competitive disadvantage for us and negatively impacting our business and financial results. Export controls targeting GPUs and semiconductors associated with AI have subjected and may in the future subject downstream users of our products to restrictions on the use, resale, repair, or transfer of our products, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Controls could negatively impact our cost and/or ability to provide services such as NVIDIA AI cloud services and could impact the cost and/or ability for our CSPs and customers to provide services to their end customers, even outside China.

Export controls have and could in the future disrupt our supply chain and distribution channels, negatively impacting our ability to serve demand, including in markets outside China and for our non-data center products. The possibility of additional export controls has negatively impacted and may in the future negatively impact demand for our products, benefiting competitors that offer alternatives less likely to be restricted by further controls. Repeated changes in the export control rules are likely to impose compliance burdens on our business and our customers, negatively and materially impacting our business.

Increasing use of economic sanctions and export controls has impacted and may in the future impact demand for our products or services, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Reduced demand due to export controls has and could in the future lead to excess inventory or cause us to incur related supply charges. Additional unilateral or multilateral controls are also likely to include deemed export control limitations that negatively impact the ability of our research and development teams to execute our roadmap or other objectives in a timely manner. Additional export restrictions may not only impact our ability to serve overseas markets, but also provoke responses from foreign governments, including China, that negatively impact our supply chain or our ability to provide our products and services to customers in all markets worldwide, which could also substantially reduce our revenue. Regulators in China have inquired about our sales and efforts to supply the China market and our fulfillment of the commitments we entered at the close of our Mellanox acquisition. On September 15, 2025, China’s antitrust regulators published their preliminary finding that our compliance with applicable U.S. export controls, which required us to offer degraded products to the Chinese market, discriminated unfairly against customers in the China market and therefore violated the terms of China’s approval of our Mellanox acquisition. If regulators conclude that we have failed to fulfill the terms of our Mellanox acquisition or we have violated any applicable law in China, we could be subject to financial penalties, restrictions on our ability to conduct our business, restrictions or other orders regarding our networking business, products, and services, or otherwise impact our operations in China, any of which could have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition.

Over inquired about our sales and efforts to supply the past three years, China market and our fulfillment of the commitments we entered into at the close of our Mellanox acquisition. On September 15, 2025, China’s antitrust regulators published their preliminary finding that our compliance with applicable U.S. export controls, which required us to offer degraded products to the Chinese market, discriminated unfairly against customers in the China market and therefore violated the terms of China’s approval of our Mellanox acquisition. If regulators conclude that we have been failed to fulfill the terms of our Mellanox acquisition or we have violated any applicable law in China, we could be subject to a series of shifting and expanding export control restrictions, impacting financial penalties, restrictions on our ability to serve customers outside the United States. conduct our business, restrictions or other orders regarding our networking business, products, and services, or otherwise impact our operations in China, any of which could have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition.

During We continue to be subject to a series of shifting and expanding export control restrictions, impacting our ability to serve customers outside the third quarter of fiscal year 2023, the USG announced export restrictions and export licensing requirements targeting China’s semiconductor and supercomputing industries. These restrictions impacted exports of certain chips, as well as software, hardware, equipment and technology used to develop, produce and manufacture certain chips to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and Russia, and specifically impact our A100 and H100 integrated circuits, DGX or any other systems or boards which incorporate A100 or H100 integrated circuits. During the second quarter of fiscal year 2024, the USG also informed us of an additional licensing requirement for a subset of A100 and H100 products destined to certain customers and other regions, including some countries in the Middle East. United States.

During the third quarter of fiscal year 2024, In August 2022, the USG announced new export restrictions and updated export licensing requirements for targeting China’s semiconductor and supercomputing industries. These restrictions impacted exports of certain chips, as well as software, hardware, equipment and technology used to develop, produce and manufacture certain chips to China (including Hong Kong and Country Groups D:1, D:4, Macau) and D:5 (including but not limited to, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Vietnam, but excluding Israel) of specifically impact our products exceeding certain performance thresholds, including, but not limited to, the A100, A800, H100, H800, L4, L40, L40S RTX 4090, GB200 NVL72, A100 and B200. The licensing requirements also apply to the export of products exceeding certain performance thresholds to a party headquartered in, H100 integrated circuits, DGX or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Country Group D5, including China. any other systems or boards which incorporate A100 or H100 integrated circuits.

On April 9, 2025, In July 2023, the USG also informed us that it requires of an additional licensing requirement for a license for export subset of A100 and H100 products destined to China (including Hong Kong certain customers and Macau) and D:5 countries, or to companies headquartered or with an ultimate parent therein, of our H20 integrated circuits and any other circuits achieving the H20’s memory bandwidth, interconnect bandwidth, or combination thereof. As a result of these new requirements, we incurred a $4.5 billion charge regions, including some countries in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026 associated with H20 for excess inventory and purchase obligations, as the demand for H20 products diminished. Middle East.

The export controls applicable In October 2023, the USG announced new and updated licensing requirements for exports to China are complex and address a variety of parameters, including the total processing performance of a chip, the “performance density” of a chip, the interconnect bandwidth of a chip, and the memory bandwidth of a chip. Under the current rules and geopolitical landscape, we are unable to create and deliver a competitive product for China’s data center market that receives approval from both the USG and the Chinese government. We have effectively been foreclosed from competing in China's data center computing/compute market, and our effective foreclosure from the China market will help our competitors build larger developer and customer ecosystems to challenge us worldwide. Unless we are able to return with a product that meets the approval of both the USG and the Chinese government, our lost opportunity and the benefit to our competitors will have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition. In addition to controls targeting Country Groups D:1, D:4 D:4, and D:5 countries, (including but not limited to, Saudi Arabia, the USG has United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, but excluding Israel) of our products exceeding certain performance thresholds, including, but not limited to, the A100, A800, H100, H800, L4, L40, L40S RTX 4090, GB200 NVL72, and B200. The licensing requirements also imposed worldwide apply to the export controls impacting our products, and may impose additional controls in the future. of products exceeding certain performance thresholds to a party headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Country Group D5, including China.

On January 15, In April 2025, the USG published informed us that it requires a license for export to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and D:5 countries, or to companies headquartered or with an ultimate parent therein, of our H20 integrated circuits and any other circuits achieving the AI Diffusion IFR H20’s memory bandwidth, interconnect bandwidth, or combination thereof. As a result of these requirements, we incurred a $4.5 billion charge in the Federal Register. The IFR would have imposed a worldwide licensing requirement on our data center products, such first quarter of fiscal year 2026 associated with H20 for excess inventory and purchase obligations, as our H200, GB200 and GB300. The AI Diffusion IFR would have divided the world into three tiers, relegating most countries to “Tier 2” status, and would have created a complex and burdensome scheme demand for licensing approvals. H20 products diminished.

In May Beginning in August 2025, the USG announced granted licenses that it would rescind allow us to ship certain H20 products to certain China-based customers. USG officials expressed an expectation that the AI Diffusion IFR and implement a replacement rule. The scope, timing, and requirements USG will receive 15% or more of the forthcoming rule remain uncertain. The replacement rule may impose new restrictions on revenue generated from licensed sales of our products or operations and/or add license requirements that could have products, but the USG did not publish a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition. For example, in October 2025, the Senate passed the “GAIN AI Act” in the NDAA. The GAIN AI Act would restrict the Trump Administration’s ability to adapt the Biden Administration’s export control rules, and could also allow private U.S. persons to review and overturn licensing and foreign policy decisions made by the Trump Administration. regulation codifying such requirement.

Beginning in February 2026, the USG granted licenses that would allow us to ship small amounts of H200 products to specific China-based customers. To date, we have not generated any revenue under the H200 licensing program, and do not yet know whether any imports will be allowed into China. The license requires that the H200s go through an inspection process in the United States prior to any shipment to the customer. As a result, any H200 shipped under the new licensing program will be subject to a 25% tariff upon importation into the United States.

In the event that we are able to sell licensed products into the China market, we may not be able to pass along all or any of the tariff to our customers, and may be subject to litigation, increased costs, and a harmed competitive position.

The export controls applicable to China are complex and address a variety of parameters, including the total processing performance of a chip, the “performance density” of a chip, the interconnect bandwidth of a chip, and the memory bandwidth of a chip. Under the current rules and geopolitical landscape, we are unable to create and deliver a competitive product for China’s data center market that receives approval from both the USG and the Chinese government. As of the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2027, while we were able to ship uncontrolled products to China, such as gaming and workstation GPUs, we were effectively foreclosed from competing in China's data center computing/compute market, and our effective foreclosure from the China market helped our competitors build larger developer and customer ecosystems to challenge us worldwide. Unless we are able to return with a data center system that meets the approval of both the USG and the Chinese government, our lost opportunity and the benefit to our competitors will have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.

In addition to controls targeting D:1, D:4 and D:5 countries, the USG has also imposed worldwide export controls impacting our products, and may impose additional controls in the future.

In January 2025, the USG published the AI Diffusion IFR in the Federal Register. The IFR would have imposed a worldwide licensing requirement on our data center products, such as our H200, GB200 and GB300. The AI Diffusion IFR would have divided the world into three tiers, relegating most countries to “Tier 2” status, and would have created a complex and burdensome scheme for licensing approvals.

In May 2025, the USG announced that it would rescind the AI Diffusion IFR and implement a replacement rule. The scope, timing, and requirements of the forthcoming rule remain uncertain. The replacement rule may impose new restrictions on our products or operations and/or add license requirements that could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition. For example, in October 2025, the Senate passed the GAIN AI Act in the National Defense Authorization Act. The GAIN AI Act would restrict the Trump Administration’s ability to adapt the Biden Administration’s export control rules and could also allow private U.S. persons to review and overturn licensing and foreign policy decisions made by the Trump Administration. Congress is also considering legislation such as the Remote Access Security Act, or RASA, which could prohibit the provision of cloud services to any company with an ultimate parent headquartered in China. If enacted, RASA could impose new restrictions on cloud service providers and OEMs, and could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.

Our competitive position has been harmed by export controls, and our competitive position and future results will be further harmed, over the long term, if the restrictions remain in place or are expanded in geographic, customer, or product scope, if customers purchase product from competitors, if customers develop their own internal solution, if we are unable to provide contractual warranty or other extended service obligations, if the USG does not grant licenses in a timely manner or denies licenses to significant customers or if we incur significant transition costs. The licensing process may not be resolved before significant business opportunities evaporate. Even if the USG grants any requested licenses, the licenses have already and may in the future be temporary, impose burdensome conditions regarding the installation, maintenance, and use of such products, or include financial or economic requirements that we or our customers or end users cannot or choose not to fulfill. The licensing requirements have already and may in the future benefit certain of our competitors, as the licensing process will make our pre-sale and post-sale technical support efforts more cumbersome and less certain and encourage customers in China, the Middle East, and other regions to pursue alternatives to our products, including semiconductor suppliers based in China, Europe, and Israel.

In August 2025, the USG granted licenses that would allow us to ship certain H20 products to certain China-based customers, but to date, we have generated approximately $50 million in H20 revenue under those licenses. USG officials have expressed an expectation that the USG will receive 15% or more of the revenue generated from licensed sales of our products, but to date, the USG has not published a regulation codifying such requirement. In the event that we are able to sell licensed products into the China market and the USG implements a regulation requiring us to pay a percentage of the revenue from such sales, we may not be able to pass along all or any of that fee to our customers, and may be subject to litigation, increased costs, and a harmed competitive position.

Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing requirements.

For example, the USG already imposed license conditions that limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, such as imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. Such government mandates in chip designs could introduce system vulnerabilities and expose us to significant risk and potential liability, negatively impact demand for our products, and could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition. Even if not enacted into binding legislation, draft bills have impacted and may in the future negatively impact our business. For example, following U.S. legislative proposals calling for mandatory features in our chips, China’s government publicly questioned whether our H20 products have built-in vulnerabilities, discouraging customers from purchasing our products. We provided a public response explaining that our GPUs, including H20, do not include such built-in vulnerabilities, and will respond to any follow-up questions we receive.

Open-source foundation models are rapidly growing in popularity with developers worldwide. The demand for open-source foundation models and applications promotes use of our products worldwide. Any regulatory control or other restriction that limits our ability to provide products and services that support third-party applications and models, including applications built on foundation models originating in China such as DeepSeek, Qwen, or KIMMI, could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.

The USG already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. For example, the French Competition Authority (FCA) is questioning whether gaming GPUs and data center GPUs are separate product categories, an inquiry that may impact the export controls applicable to gaming products sold in France and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong.

Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training.

Export controls have and are likely in the future to have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve

and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results.

As a result, export controls have in the past and may in the future negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale, resulting in excess inventory and purchase obligations as we recently experienced with the H20. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls.

The increasingly complex export controls impose complex and burdensome compliance obligations on our partners, suppliers, and customers. We have provided and will continue to provide assistance to authorities regarding attempted diversion, but as we do not have physical control of our products after sale, we must also rely on the compliance programs of our customers and partners. While we seek to strictly comply with all applicable export control regulators, reports of diversion of controlled products, even when unsubstantiated and untrue, or any compliance failure at a customer or partner, may negatively impact our business, relationships with partners and customers, and our reputation. Incorrect allegations that our compliance efforts satisfy the letter but not the “spirit” of the applicable regulations, as well as incorrect allegations that legitimate and appropriate business is using supposed “loopholes” in the export controls may negatively impact our business, relationships with partners and customers, and our reputation.

In addition to export controls, the USG may impose restrictions on the import and sale of products that incorporate technologies developed or manufactured in whole or in part in China. For example, the USG adopted “Connected Vehicle” restrictions on the import and sale of certain automotive products in the United States, which if adopted and interpreted broadly, could impact our ability to develop and supply solutions for our automotive customers. The USG is also considering restrictions that would limit our ability to support third-party applications and models built on open-source foundation models originating in China. Such restrictions, if implemented, would favor our foreign competitors and negatively impact our business.

Additionally, restrictions imposed by the Chinese government on the duration of gaming activities and access to games may adversely affect our Gaming Edge Computing revenue, and even if we are able to participate in the China data center compute market, increased oversight of digital platform companies may adversely affect our Data Center revenue. The Chinese government has encouraged customers to purchase from our China-based competitors and restricted discouraged customers from purchasing, importing, or using our data center products, including any China-specific product designed to comply with U.S. export controls. As another example, an agency of the Chinese government announced an Action Plan that endorses new standards regarding the compute performance per watt and per memory bandwidth of accelerators used in new and renovated data centers in China. Although we are already effectively foreclosed from the China market by U.S. export controls, if those controls changed to allow us to return to the market, the Chinese government could modify or implement the Action Plan in a way that effectively prevents us from being able to design products to meet the new standard, which may restrict the ability of customers to use some of our data center products and may have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition. Further restrictions on our products or the products of our suppliers could negatively impact our business and financial results.

Finally, our business depends on our ability to receive consistent and reliable supply from our overseas partners, especially in Taiwan and South Korea. Any new restrictions that negatively impact our ability to receive supply of components, parts, or services from Taiwan and South Korea, would negatively impact our business and financial results.

Issuer Purchases of Equity Securities

On August We repurchased 108 million shares of our common stock for $20.2 billion during the first quarter of fiscal year 2027. As of April 26, 2025, 2026, we were authorized, subject to certain specifications, to repurchase up to $38.5 billion of our Board of Directors approved an additional $60.0 billion in share repurchase authorization, without expiration. common stock.

We repurchased 70 million and 262 million shares On May 18, 2026, our Board of our common stock for $12.6 Directors approved an additional $80.0 billion and $36.7 billion during the third quarter and first nine months of fiscal year 2026, respectively. As of October 26, 2025, we were authorized, subject to certain specifications, to in share repurchase up to $62.2 billion of our common stock. authorization, without expiration.

We paid cash dividends to our shareholders of $243 million and $732 million during the third first quarter and first nine months of fiscal year 2027. On May 18, 2026, respectively. The payment we increased our quarterly cash dividend from $0.01 per share to $0.25 per share to all shareholders of future record on June 4, 2026. Our quarterly cash dividends is subject to our Board of Directors' continuing determination that the declaration of dividends is in the best interests of our shareholders. dividend will be paid on June 26, 2026.

The following table presents details payment of future cash dividends is subject to our Board of Directors' continuing determination that the declaration of dividends is in the best interests of our share repurchase transactions during the third quarter of fiscal year 2026: shareholders.

(1) Average price paid per share includes broker commissions, but excludes our liability under the 1% excise tax on the net amount The following table presents details of our share repurchases required by repurchase transactions during the Inflation Reduction Act first quarter of 2022. fiscal year 2027:

From October 27, 2025 through November 14, 2025, we repurchased 6 million shares for $1.1 billion pursuant to a pre-established trading plan. (1) Average price paid per share includes broker commissions but excludes our liability under the 1% excise tax on the net amount of our share repurchases required by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

We may execute repurchases from time to time, subject to market conditions, operating requirements and other investment opportunities, in the open market, in privately negotiated privately-negotiated transactions, pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan or in structured share repurchase agreements in compliance with Rule 10b-18 of the Exchange Act. Our share repurchase program may be suspended at any time at our discretion.

Employee Equity Incentive Program Share Withholding

We withhold shares of our common stock associated with net share settlements to cover tax withholding obligations of awards under our employee equity incentive program. During the third first quarter and first nine months of fiscal year 2026, 2027, we withheld approximately 14 million and 39 12 million shares, respectively, for a total value of $2.4 $2.1 billion and $5.8 billion, respectively, through net share settlements.

Recent Sales of Unregistered Securities and Use of Proceeds

On August 6, 2025, February 17, 2026, we acquired a company and issued to a key employees employee a total of 97,075 37,890 shares of our common stock, valued at $17 approximately $7 million based on our closing stock price on the issuance date.

The above securities were On April 10, 2026, we acquired a company and issued in to key employees a transaction not involving a public offering pursuant to an exemption from registration set forth in Section 4(a)(2) total of 72,972 shares of our common stock, valued at approximately $14 million based on our closing stock price on the Securities Act (and Regulation D or Regulation S promulgated thereunder). issuance date.

The above securities were issued in transactions not involving a public offering pursuant to an exemption from registration set forth in Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act (and Regulation D or Regulation S promulgated thereunder).

Item 5. Other Information

The following members of our Board of Directors and/or officers adopted, modified, or terminated a trading arrangement that is intended to satisfy the affirmative defense conditions of Rule 10b5-1(c), or a Rule 10b5-1 Trading Arrangement:

* Includes 38,042 shares from future vests of equity awards, and the actual number of shares The Rule 10b5-1 Trading Arrangement is solely for gifts to be sold will be net of shares withheld by the Company for taxes. charitable donor-advised funds.

** The Rule 10b5-1 Trading Arrangement was adopted on December 18, 2025, for sales through March 23, 2027. No shares were sold under the Rule 10b5-1 Trading Arrangement prior to termination.

Item 6. Exhibits

+ Management contract or compensatory plan or arrangement.

* Filed herewith.

# In accordance with Item 601(b)(32)(ii) of Regulation S-K and SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986, Final Rule: Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, the certifications furnished in Exhibits 32.1 and 32.2 hereto are deemed to accompany this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q and will not be deemed “filed” for purpose of Section 18 of the Exchange Act. Such certifications will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the registrant specifically incorporates it by reference.

Copies of the above exhibits not contained herein are available to any shareholder upon written request to:

Investor Relations: NVIDIA Corporation, 2788 San Tomas Expressway, Santa Clara, CA 95051.

Signature

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized.

Date: November 19, 2025 May 20, 2026